"Nietzsche, Polytheism, and Parody" is the final essay of I<lossowski's book, Un sifuneste desir (Such a Deathfy Desire) , first published in 1963. 6 It is one of two essays in the book that are devoted explicitly to Nietzsche; the second, "On Some Fundamental Themes of Nietzsche's Gaya Scienza," is the opening essay of the volume and had previously appeared as an introduction to Klossowski's translation of The Gay Science. 7 "Nietzsche, Polytheism, and Parody" had not previously appeared in print, although I<lossowski had presented it as a lecture at the College de Philosophie in Paris in 1957. Together, the two essays on Nietzsche bound aseries of reflections on Gide, Blanchot, Bataille, and others, all of which appeared previously-sometimes in a different form-and that taken together explicate I<lossowski's conception of "the demon."
The conception of the demon, drawn from The Gay Science, 8 . is for I<lossowski a figuration of the double life of the existing human being: both conscious, rational, goal-directed, as weIl as vital, passionate, a victim of intensities.
One of the chief concerns of I<lossowski's work on Nietzsehe, including the present essay, is the communicability of Nietzsche's thought. 9 For IZlossowski, the possible communication of this work must be taken up and thought according to the internallogic of Nietzsche's own writingswhich include both his published works and his letters and notes. However, rather than merely seeking to judge the accuracy, appropriateness, or truthfulness of this thoughtaIl styles of interpretation that would preserve arefuge for the interpreter, a distance from the thought under consideration-I<lossowski implicates the interpreter within the interpretation. This is not to say that bis work on Nietzsche is an attempt to restate Nietzsche's thought, or to somehow clarify or explain it. Klossowski takes Nietzsche as the bearer or sign of a complex of symptoms, and his essay maps the strategy of this engagement according to the three intertwined elements announced by the title.
To begin with Nietzsehe is not to begin with a historicaIly existent being or with an author. As I<lossowski makes clear by referring to the ail-too-recent appropriations of Nietzsche's works (as weil as "Nietzschean" concepts and styles) by the Nazis, the word "Nietzsche" is only a mark, a sign. To divide or merely juxtapose the historical inclividual and the content of the works that bear his name is to ignore the in.junctions of both against seeing either as independent of a single experiment. According to this experiment, Nietzsche the professor of philology at Basel gives way to the more audacious figure of the later works (from The Gqy Science through the final letters), but then this "visionary" Nietzsche-as !(1ossowski describes him-gives way, in turn, to the figure of Zarathustra. This double movement repeats the logic of the transformation of the true world into a fable, as described in a famous passage from Twilight of the Idols: 10 the proposal of the audacious line of thinking by the professor who, as a teacher, is interested in the truth; the impossibility of the actualization of this thought within a teachable form; and the resultant production oE the character of Zarathustra, of an "actor," therefore neither truthful nor merely apparent, that foilows from the necessary coincidence of thought and its impossibility.
Polytheism seems to be a late topic of the essay, hardly worthy of inclusion in the title. But polytheism is for !(1ossowski the product of Eabulation-the being oE the fable-itself the product of the recoil oE Nietzsche's thought upon itselE, of his notion oE fatum. Fatum is the conjunction or synthesis oE uttering nonsense ("raving") and prediction; oE the moment prior to the creation of meaning and the moment following that meaning's accomplishment. For Klossowski, such a synthesis is effectuated "in the forgetting (of the historical situation) that was preliminary to the act oE creating: in forgetting, t11e past is remembered [sous-vient a) by humans as their future, wmch takes the figure of thepast."ll The nonsense oE raving is not mere gibberish; it is the utterance oE the cliscontinuity lurking within the inclividual. As such, it is a type oE speaking that Eorgets its place in time -placement, or order, being what gives any utterance its proper meaning-and, in losing its place, reveals that place as a moment in which the past comes to determination by being set into an order and thereby given a meaning. Rendered indeterminate by the raving that counters its own utterance, the one who speaks is undercut by the momentum of the vital impulses of the past that sustain but no longer submit to the yoke of the determining consciousness. In raving, the determinate one is rendered into the vital multiple, and this multiplicity is nothing other than the persistence of the paste
The notion of fatum, however, conjoins this vital will to live with the rational will to truth: prediction, the positing of the goal of action. Not only is this antinomy not to be overcome-it cannot be sublated, for Nietzsche or Klossowski-it is itself constitutive of the highest aspiration of thought: the eternal return. How then are the poles of this antinomy conjoined? Pathos, "the unconscious life of impulses," is what raves as consciousness "sub-comes" to its own vitality. But, in reflecting on this vitallife, consciousness inverts these very impulses; it forms an image of them as goal-seeking, where the search for a goal is the distinctive mark of conscious willing. Stripping this mark away, "unthinking" consciousness, the impulses are satisfied in what I<lossowski calls their "dissipation" [depenseJ. This unconscious life is exposed in moments of vital exuberance (of pain or pleasure) whose intensity is grasped only retrospectively and always with the inkling that this remembering is itself a forgetting of the most essential aspect of the experience. In the accomplishments of pathos, of unconscious impulses, the greatest desires of life are satisfied, but these are the very desires that consciousness sets out to fulfill in its search for truth. Consciousness, then, as the impulse or will to stabilize the impulses themselves through the determination of the ends or goals of their activity-and this is the will to truth that foreteils, that predicts the constancy that will be satisfaction-in fact wills its dissipation insofar as this dissipation is the accomplishment of the activity (as activity) of vitality. The will to truth engenders fabulation, the "necessity" of the reversal of the life of consciousness such that the raving of fatum, which is always apprehended retrospectively, could become the object of prediction. This is the circular law of the eternal return.
Truth as willed error-the law of thought discovered in Nietzsche-is formulated finally as the combative juxtaposition of two gods: "Dionysus versus the Crucified." But this duality is that of the one and the many, not of two distinct unities. Polytheism is the expression of the "raving," vital aspect of existence; "God is dead" expresses a liquidation of the guarantor of identity, and not a simple transfer (to humanity, for instance). Individual existence becomes fragmentary, fortuitous, insofar as it is discovered as the unstable equilibrium of vital and rational forces. In its need for stability, for meaning, and therefore for identity, the individual does not come upon but is swept under by the heterogeneous aspirations of the unconscious impulses that are conjoined with consciousness by chance. Every individual is a perpetual moment-and a perpetuum mobile-of equilibrium, of creation and the reverence that preserves what is created. The world is thus filled with those gods and goddesses (figures of the will to externalization) engendered by this equilibrium, deities with as many forms as there are expressions of vitality: jealous, warlike, loving, wrathful, crafty gods capable of unlimited couplings, combinations and transformations.
Finally, parody. !<lossowski cautions at the outset of the essay that no other author seems to lead their interpreter to parody as Nietzsche does. Indeed, what could be more inclined to repetition than a thought that conjoins the will to create and the will to revere-the twin temptations of the interpreter. On the one hand, a will to fill the lacunae, to reconcile the apparent contradictions, to orient and subsume the author's work to a single purpose or thesis. On the other hand, a will to celebrate the insights that ring true and excoriate those that ring false, to prioritize the passages that are, for the interpreter, those that are most deeply affecting, to singularize the insights or blunders even as they are repeated, to revere or to condemn (which itself is merely an inversion of reverence) under the guise of critical engagement. The very tide of the essay signals I<lossowski's acknowledgement of tbis bind, and his persistence ensures bis parody. But this very acknowledgement voids the essay's pretensions to singularity, its own prejudices. It thus concludes with laughter-the voice of an ass, repeated, and serving as the affirmative seal of the pathos implicated within its thesis. 
